Trump Signs New Order to Vastly Expand Presidential Powers

<h3>5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (APA) — Agency action “not in accordance with law” / “in excess of statutory jurisdiction”</h3><ul><li>The executive order asserts “Presidential supervision and control of the entire executive branch” and targets traditionally independent agencies (FEC, FCC, FTC, SEC), creating substantial risk that resulting directives/budget interventions would exceed statutory schemes that insulate certain functions from direct White House control.</li><li>Assigning OMB Director Russell Vought to set “performance standards,” report on agency heads, and amend agency budgets to advance presidential priorities may be challenged as ultra vires if it effectively overrides congressionally mandated independence or decision-making processes.</li></ul><h3>2 U.S.C. § 437c (Federal Election Commission structure) / statutory independence constraints (general) — Interference risk</h3><ul><li>Because the order expressly reaches the FEC, it raises an investigative red flag for politicized control of election enforcement—an area Congress structured for bipartisan, commission-based independence.</li><li>Article context does not allege a specific enforcement action taken at Trump/Vought’s direction, leaving key “official act” and concrete interference elements fact-dependent and likely to be litigated rather than prosecuted.</li></ul><h3>18 U.S.C. § 371 — Conspiracy to defraud the United States (impairing lawful governmental functions)</h3><ul><li>The described plan to use OMB oversight to reshape independent agencies’ policy execution could, if paired with deceptive means or covert pressure to impair lawful agency functions, implicate a § 371 “defraud” theory.</li><li>Here, the article describes an openly issued executive order and does not allege deception, concealment, or coordinated corrupt pressure tactics; additional facts would be required for criminal exposure.</li></ul><h3>18 U.S.C. §§ 201, 1346, 666 (bribery/honest services/program bribery) — Structural corruption screen</h3><ul><li>The article alleges a major expansion of control and a key subordinate (Vought) consolidating authority, but it does not allege any payment, personal enrichment, or third-party benefit exchanged for official action.</li><li>Absent money/access/benefit alignment, the facts read as a power-consolidation/legal-theory test rather than a transactional quid pro quo.</li></ul><b>Conclusion:</b> The conduct described presents a serious investigative red flag for politicization and ultra vires interference with congressionally designed independent agencies, but the article does not allege a transactional corruption structure or concrete criminal elements sufficient for a likely criminal classification on these facts alone.